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July 6, 2008

The Graying of College Faculties

The Graying of College Faculties-Becker

A recent New York Times article indicated that the fraction of full-time faculty members in the United States older than age 50 more than doubled between 1969 and 2005, increasing from 23 percent to over 50 percent. We explore why this graying of American academia occurred, and some of its consequences.

Most of the professors who have been retiring in recent years took their first academic jobs in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Colleges and universities were expanding rapidly during those years, which meant that job opportunities were abundant and many young faculty members were added. New hiring slowed as the rate of growth of higher education slowed down in the 1990s and afterwards, which decreased the ratio of younger to older faculty.

Congress passed a law in the early 1990s that made it illegal for colleges to force faculty members to retire unless the schools clearly demonstrated that a professor could not teach or do research at a modestly high level. Prior to that law, colleges forced their faculties to retire at a given age, usually 65, and made exceptions for those members they considered special in their teaching, research, or other contributions. Two former colleagues of mine, the Nobel Prize-winning economists George Stigler and T. W. Schultz, were kept on for this reason- in Stigler's case until he died at age 81, while Schultz did not fully retire until he was in his mid-eighties.

This is a bad law because colleges now cannot force less competent or less energetic older faculty to retire while keeping the more productive faculty members since they are required by law to offer the same retirement terms to their entire faculty. The older system allowed schools to undo some of the harmful effects of the faculty tenure system by eventually retiring faculty that they should never have appointed. to be sure, given the strong competition among schools of higher education in the United States, the growing physical and mental health of older faculty might anyway have led colleges to raise the general retirement age.

Colleges have tried to cope with their inability to force retirement by offering a variety of bonuses to all faculty members who agree to retire voluntarily or go from full time to part time. However, if older members of a faculty like their jobs, optimal buyout plans that try to induce voluntary retirement would generally lead to later retirements than under a compulsory system that is flexible enough to allow for treating different faculty differently. As a result, these buyout plans have not prevented faculties from aging, although they have slowed that down since about a third of eligible older faculty members usually agree to be bought out. Unfortunately, these plans often have an adverse selection effect since the more capable faculty are the ones who frequently accept a buyout. They may not retire but instead take a job elsewhere, often outside of academia.

The sharply improved healthiness of older Americans has led many of them to continue working at later ages than did earlier generations. This is true for all types of jobs, but the effect is especially important in occupations requiring intellectual and other mental skills, such as teaching and research at colleges. These skills now usually last until men and women are in their seventies, whereas physical skills, say those required in masonry or assembly line work, tend to decline rapidly as workers get into their fifties.

It is more difficult to understand the consequences than the causes of the aging of academic faculties, although one obvious effect is that opportunities for young PhDs have deteriorated. The slowdown in the expansion of institutions of higher learning in the past couple of decades has increased the scarcity of academic positions for younger PhDs. As a result, young academics have to concentrate more on doing good enough teaching and producing enough research to merit tenure in this tougher environment. Adding to this job pressure for American academics is that the market for faculty, along with that of many other services, has gone global since students from all over the world come in large numbers to get their graduate education at American universities, especially in the sciences, economics, and a few of the more humanistic fields. Many of the best of the foreign students stay on to teach and do research. They compete against Americans looking for academic positions, and hence narrow the market for Americans. Indeed, their competition partly explains why in many fields fewer Americans are getting their PhDs, and instead are taking MBAs, law degrees, and other advanced degrees where competition from foreigners has so far been less severe.

One might think that aging faculties would tilt toward a more politically conservative faculty since older persons tend to be more conservative. However, as the Times article indicates, this does not appear to be true with regard to the faculty aging that is occurring now. Many older faculty members, especially in the humanities and social sciences, were active in the student and civil rights movements of the 1960s and '70s, and have maintained a radical, often Marxist, orientation toward events and history. The tough competition for academic jobs gives younger faculty much less time for radical and other political causes. Moreover, younger faculty went to school after many of these cultural wars were over, and they have more moderate views, although most still consider themselves Democrats, and are usually anti-markets and anti-business.

Important new ideas in different fields come disproportionately from younger persons, and academic research is no exception. Significant advances not only in mathematics, but also in biology (such as Crick and Watson), in economics, and even in the humanities have typically been made by younger rather than older persons. This means that while the aging of faculties at American universities adds greater experience, faculties have lost some freshness of approach that comes from having younger faculty. Of course, it is possible, and perhaps even probable, that growing life expectancy and healthiness of older persons will shift ages of peak creativity toward older ages as well.

The one recommendation from my analysis that would slow down the aging of college faculties is to abolish the federal law that prevents colleges from having compulsory retirement ages for most faculty members. The strong competition among these schools would lead to more effective utilization of older teachers and researchers than would result from legislation and regulations.

Aging Professors: Posner's Comment

I agree with Becker that it would be good if universities (if everybody) were permitted to impose a mandatory retirement age on their employees. As a matter of theory, however, the removal in 1994 of the professorial exemption from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's ban on mandatory retirement ages need not have affected the average age of retirement of professors. In general, a law that affects only one term in a contract should have little effect on behavior, because its effect can usually be nullified by a change in another term. Eliminating mandatory retirement age is a good example. If a university wants professors to retire at, say, age 65, it can pay them to do so; that is, it can buy out their tenure contract. In the long run, the professoriat itself will pay for the buyouts, at least in part, because the opportunity for a buyout is a valuable option for which professors will be willing to pay by accepting a somewhat lower wage. (See the discussion of mandatory retirement in chapter 13 of my 1995 book Aging and Old Age.)

Even if the result of abolishing mandatory retirement age is higher costs for universities, to the extent that all competing universities are affected, they will be able to shift most of the cost to students in the form of higher tuition. And to the extent that even generous buyouts are refused, universities can offset the effect by increased hiring of young faculty, albeit at increased cost. For just as higher energy costs need not alter the age mix of the faculty, neither need the abolition of mandatory retirement do so. Of course, this assumes that universities want a youthful faculty. As Becker points out, and I below, there is a good reason for universities to want to have a youthful faculty: young faculty tend to be more innovative.

The average age of professors has increased, but the increase may largely have resulted from factors unrelated to the abolition of mandatory retirement ages: namely, continued rather dramatic increases in the health and energy--the youthfulness--of the elderly (which may narrow the productivity gap with young faculty); lighter workloads in elite universities; and delegation of teaching to teaching assistants and non-tenure-track teachers, reducing the demand for tenure-track faculty and hence increasing the average age of tenured faculty.

The political divergence between old and young faculty (the older being more leftwing) is at first glance odd. If the adoption of a political ideology is driven by information, then since the information available to young and old is the same there should be no age-related difference in ideology. It is plausible that the young would be drawn to more extreme positions, whether left or right, on the political spectrum because lack of experience would make them more susceptible to radical schemes. But in academia it seems that Marxist and other extreme positions are more commonly embraced by the old than by the young.

I doubt that the adoption of a political ideology is normally a result of a rational weighing of information. I think it is more commonly a matter of temperament interacting with aspects of personal identity (such as race and sex), life experiences, and nonrational beliefs, such as religious beliefs. (I argue this in my recently published book How Judges Think.) This makes ideology resistant to change based on new information. The expansion of the universities in the 1960s, together with the waning of antisemitism in university admissions and faculty appointments, resulted in a large influx of Jews, and Jews, for reasons never adequately explained, are disproportionately left-leaning. In addition, the expansion must have lowered the age of faculty, and for the further reason that teaching provided a refuge from the draft during the Vietnam War.

The extreme to which the youth of the 1960s was drawn was leftist, and the left in the 1960s was farther to the left than today's left. If, therefore, ideology is largely resistant to information, there will be a tendency for a person's ideological identity to persist notwithstanding events, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of free-market ideology, that might be expected to move a "rational" ideologue rightward.

Becker rightly points to the danger that an increased age of university faculty members will result in reduced innovation. But this cannot be seen as an automatic or inevitable consequence of the age discrimination law even apart from the theoretical argument that I began with, because, assuming an inverse correlation between productivity and age, universities can lower the age profile of their faculty without violating the law and probably without even having to expand the faculty. The age-discrimination law applies equally to private businesses, but one does not hear it argued that there are too many old employees in private firms. Universities could abandon tenure and adopt performance-based compensation schemes. In addition, they could reduce the possibly too methodologically conservative influence of older faculty by reducing the role of faculty in appointing new faculty members.