November 2, 2008
"Does the Free Market Corrode Moral Character?"
"Does the Free Market Corrode Moral Character?"-Becker
The title of this discussion is taken from a question put by the John Templeton
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Foundation to leading scientists, scholars, and public figures. The foundation published some of the answers in the New York Times on October19th. It is obvious from the revelations during this financial crisis, the Enron scandal, and other business scandals, that dishonest and morally corrupt figures sometimes are among the leaders in highly competitive industries. Hollywood has often highlighted these figures, such as the morally bankrupt Gordon Gekko in Oliver Stone's film "Wall Street", which probably contributed to the general perception of businessmen as corrupt. Moreover, polls in the United States and Europe usually find that businessmen get a low rating when people are asked about whether they respect them, or believe they are honest, although congressmen in recent polls get an even lower rating than businessmen. If the question had been put to me, I would have first discussed whether corrupt and dishonest businessmen make greater profits than honest and morally admirable businessmen. Honest businessman would be more successful than corrupt ones when they compete against each other in a free market, as long as consumers can punish dishonest businessmen by not giving them repeat business, (when repeat business is necessary to succeed). Dishonest businessmen may make greater profits in the short run, but honest businessmen make higher profits in the longer run because cheaters cannot attract back customers who they cheated. Two conditions must be operative for this process to be effective:1) customers must be able to detect when they are being cheated or misled, and 2) customers must be frequent enough buyers, so that repeat business is an important determinant of profitability. Both these conditions often prevail, but one or the other may be absent under certain circumstances. For example, repeat business is not so important in vacation areas where tourists seldom come back. Then morally corrupt and dishonest businessmen may do relatively well, although tourists do get recommendations from friends who have been there before, or from the hotels where they stay. Another example deals with certain durable consumer goods since consumers only infrequently purchase expensive goods like a car or home. Although repeat business is less important in these markets, consumers will put more time and research into considering decisions that require large expenditures. In addition, word of mouth information about the reputations of different sellers can hurt the dishonest sellers. Even when repeat business is important, consumers would not be able to punish corrupt businessmen if they cannot readily determine whether or not they have been cheated or badly misled. For example, consumers who buy defective used cars that break down only after a year or so of driving may blame the breakdowns on their own actions rather than on the quality of the cars that were sold to them. Adam Smith claimed that businessmen were, on the whole, more trustworthy than diplomats. His argument was based on the importance of repeated interactions. Essentially, Smith argued that repeat business was usually more important to businessmen than to diplomats. Smith argued that diplomats frequently broke treaties since treaties are made infrequently. As a result, the gain from breaking treaties often exceeds the gain from living up to the obligations imposed by the treaties. Another, much more famous, result of Adam Smith shows that under certain conditions, businessmen in competitive industries would promote the general welfare, even though they were only trying to increase their profits. These conditions include that businessmen are prevented from colluding-Smith correctly argued that businessmen try to collude in order to exercise monopoly power- and Smith assumed consumers could punish dishonest businessmen. Many critics judge the performance of free markets relative to alternatives the way a judge might make her decision about the winner of a beauty contest between two contestants. She chose the second contestant after seeing the warts on the first one. Prominent and not so prominent businessmen in market economies have been involved in various scandals where they have provided misleading information, lie, sell shoddy and dangerous products, and the like. When such scandals arise, there is a clamor for greater regulation in the sectors where the scandals occurred, and sometimes even for government takeovers of these enterprises. This presumes that regulators and government officials act with sufficient knowledge about the industries involved, and with great wisdom and morality. Unfortunately, often that is not the case. Aside from the not infrequent cases of outright bribery of regulators and legislators, many other more subtle ways exist to bias, even corrupt, officials when their decisions replace the forces of market competition. Regulators often get "captured" by the companies they regulate, so that regulations are developed to keep out competition rather than promote greater honest competition (this capture theory was given an economic interpretation by our late friend, colleague, and Nobel-prize winning economist, George Stigler). One of the more notorious examples is the former Civil Aeronautics Board that was supposed to regulate competition among airlines, but had trouble giving approval to new airlines to compete against the established airlines. Legislators sometimes bail out companies in financial distress, or restrict competition from abroad in order to raise the profitability of domestic companies-in effect they become tools of these companies at the expense of taxpayers and consumers. Why should American automakers get subsidies from the government during this present crisis, and in the past, when they have repeatedly made bad production, marketing, and labor contract decisions during the past 30 years? A free market in the automobile industry with less government involvement would have given American consumers faster and easier access to the cheaper and better cars made by Japanese, German, and now Korean companies. I might add in concluding that I have spent my whole career in academia, and I have witnessed many examples of morally corrupt behavior by professors. So it is far from obvious to me that businessmen have worse morality than professors, although I may be making the same mistake in this inference as the judge did in the beauty contest I referred to earlier who had seen up close only some of the contestants.
Does the Free Market Corrode Moral Character? Posner's Comment
The essays commissioned by the John Templeton Foundation and available at www.templeton.org/market/ offer a variety of answers to the question whether free markets corrode moral character. Becker's posting offers an interestingly different answer, and I shall offer a different answer as well.
Different cultures and, within cultures, different occupations both select for different character traits and shape character traits. Let me start with culture. One can distinguish between a culture built on notions of honor, military prowess, and status within a hierarchy often based on birth, on the one hand, and a commercial culture on the other. English history is a case study of the transition from the first to the second, the second having been realized in the United States earlier and more fully than in the mother country. The two types of culture select for and inculcate quite different character traits--reckless physical courage, a fierce concern with personal honor, identification with a group (family, dynasty, or nation), and hierarchic control in the former; cooperativeness, empathy, tact, politeness, intelligence, individualism, self-interest, prudence, and deferral of satisfactions (i.e., a low discount rate) in the latter. Aggressiveness and a willingness to deceive are constants, although deception is more skillfully deployed in a commercial society.
Politicians possess and cultivate the traits associated with whatever culture they operate in. Honor-based societies attract charismatic leaders, often warriors; democratic societies model their politics on the economic market. As Schumpeter explained in his unfortunately rather neglected economic theory of democracy (sometimes called "competitive democracy"), democratic politicians, constituting the members of a governing class much like the business community in the economic domain, compete for the support of "consumers" (= voters) who "pay" (vote) for the competitor whose product (a package of policies, values, and leadership traits) they prefer.
People in a commercial society are probably more self-interested than people in an honor-based society, because the latter are more likely to identify with leaders or causes than to behave as separate individuals with individual tastes and goals. Although commercial society selects for and encourages traits that we are apt to think "good," such as cooperativeness, intelligence, and empathy, in fact these qualities are morally neutral. Intelligent and cooperative businessmen, whose empathetic qualities enable them to manipulate consumers' emotions and intellectual limits, will be prone to collude with their competitors and defraud their consumers, as well as to ignore pollution and other externalities that economic activity produces. That is why even libertarians, with the exception of anarcho-capitalist extremists, believe that antitrust and antifraud laws are necessary controls over commercial activity.
Even without such laws, it is true, not all markets would be riven by collusion and fraud. Collusion invites free riding, since a seller can increase its profits by slightly undercutting the cartel price; and the reputation concerns stressed by Becker will often deter fraud. But without any regulation, cartel agreements would be legally enforceable, which would discourage free riding, though they would be eroded by new entry--but often the new entrants, attracted by supracompetitive prices, would be less efficient than the incumbent firms. Reputation concerns will not deter deceptive advertising concerning traits shared by all products in the market in question. A cigarette advertiser who advertises that his cigarettes are "safer" than competitors' cigarettes is reminding consumers that smoking is in fact unsafe. The cigarette companies (also the automobile manufacturers) tried for decades to conceal the dangers inherent in their products, since trumpeting those dangers would have reduced demand.
Businessmen also have an incentive to manipulate the regulatory process, seek tax loopholes, and the like. Although we tend to blame politicians and bureaucrats for bad policies, often they are merely brokering interest-group deals. In a democratic society, it is legitimate (in fact inevitable) for policy to yield to the demands of interest groups. We should not blame politicians who are honest agents of politically powerful forces. Politicians who do not yield to those forces are ineffectual.
Of course politicians lie a great deal, but so does anyone who depends on the goodwill of others. Max Weber in a famous essay on politics as a vocation distinguished between private and public morality. Anyone in a public position--and this includes business and academic leaders as well as politicians--cannot indulge a taste for candor or altruism and expect to be successful at his job. It is the same reason why good business leaders drive hard bargains with their suppliers, play off subordinates against one another, lay off workers by the thousands, receive huge compensation packages, and often relocate plants overseas when foreign wages and taxes are lower.
The difference between public and private morality shows that even honesty is a morally neutral quality. Often the regulations imposed on business are mindless and crippling and to survive a businessman must violate them; in doing so he promotes both his own welfare and that of society as a whole.
History teaches that a commercial society is bound to be more prosperous and peaceful than an honor-based traditional society. The commercial culture creates incentives and constraints that, provided that economic activity is effectively regulated, (an important qualification) maximizes the values that are important to most people. This doesn't mean that people in a commercial society are "better" than people in other types of society. The human race is genetically uniform, and our "moral" genes are not much different from the corresponding genes in chimpanzees. The success of commercial societies just illustrates that different institutional structures produce different human behavior.