January 17, 2011
Raising Public-College Tuition
Raising Public-College Tuition—Posner
A number of states are in quite desperate financial straits. They have huge debt, and like members of the eurozone, cannot lighten their debt load by inflating their currency or by improving their trade balance by devaluation. It is natural that they should be raising fees, such as college tuition. Whether this is the best way to reduce debt is a separate question, but probably an academic one; the pattern of revenue enhancement and cost reduction that a state embraces depends on the political balance in the state, rather than on what is efficient or otherwise in the public interest.
As Becker points out, there are external benefits to higher education. In the narrowest terms, college-educated persons (especially college graduates) have significantly higher incomes than the non-college-educated population, and those higher incomes generate higher tax revenues, which finance government expenditures that are used to finance government programs that largely benefit other people. The amount of the external benefits cannot actually be measured, however, because the decision to attend college is not random; generally, it is the intellectually abler who attend college, and their higher incomes are the combined result of their personal characteristics and the increased skills that college imparts to them. Nevertheless there is little doubt that college does generate external benefits, which creates a case for subsidy.
Whether it is a good case is a separate question. Because college contributes to higher earnings, which are not taxed until earned (that is, the asset, consisting of future expected earnings, that is obtained by attending college is not taxed), attending college is attractive to anyone who has sufficient intelligence and discipline to benefit from it, and he or she can borrow to finance tuition and living expenses.
In any event, there is no case at all from an overall social standpoint for subsidizing students who would pay full college tuition, without the inducement of a subsidy; the subsidy does not induce students to obtain a college education who otherwise would not because they could not afford to; it is a windfall to their families. Private colleges recognize this. They charge very high tuition (though not high enough to cover all their costs—but they have other sources of funds, such as alumni donations), but grant scholarships or loans to students whose families can't afford the tuition. Charging low tuition to everyone, as public colleges do for residents of the state in which the college or university is located), does not make economic sense; it merely as I said provides windfalls to families willing and able to pay the full tuition. As Becker points out, this results in regressive redistribution of income, because families that can pay full tuition are wealthier than the average taxpayer, who pays for the costs of public colleges that tuition doesn't cover.
This situation presents a case for a virtuous tax increase (raising a fee for a public service is the equivalent of a tax): the increase helps to close the state's fiscal gap; the burden of the increased tax is borne entirely by the well-to-do; and some of the higher revenue can be used to subsidize students unable to afford the higher tuition.
There is still an argument against the tuition increase, which resembles the economic argument for the moratorium on increasing the federal income tax rate even on taxpayers who have very high incomes—even incomes of a million dollars or more a year (a proposal for eliminating the Bush tax cuts for those taxpayers was made by liberals but rejected by Congress). The argument is that any tax increase will reduce private spending (consumption and investment) unless the tax revenues are used to increase such spending; and given the still very shaky state of the U.S. economy, any measure that reduces such spending is suspect. Well-off families will have to allocate more of their income to their children's education, and so will reduce their other spending. The revenue from the higher tuition will flow into the state's coffers, but the question is whether the effect of that flow in stimulating investment and consumption will be greater than the decline in personal spending by persons paying the higher tuition. Conceivably, increasing tuition could retard economic recovery, though it is nevertheless a sensible long-term measure of fiscal reform because there is no reason to subsidize tuition of persons able and willing to pay it without subsidy.
I said earlier that the combination of tax (or fee) increases and spending cuts that states are adopting in an effort to alleviate their debt burden depends on the balance of politically effective interest groups. Well-to-do families will fight efforts to increase college tuition across the board. So of course will the state universities and other public colleges. Low tuition, made up for by public subsidies, helps state and city colleges and universities attract students who would otherwise go to private colleges and universities. Increasing tuition may increase state college revenues, assuming that demand is inelastic (meaning that the percentage fall in demand because of the higher price is less than the proportionate increase in price, so that revenue rises) within the range of the increase, but it will reduce the quality of the student body.
The proposed tuition increases raise the broader question whether states should be in the position of providing higher education, rather than leaving it to the market to private. In fact state universities have been weaning themselves from state support. At prestitgious public universities such as the University of Michigan, state subsidies now account for only about 10 percent of the university's budget. The fact that a state legislature can raise state university tuition at will, or stated otherwise reduce subsidy at will, creates the kind of financial uncertainty that has brought English universities low. Universities supported by diverse financial sources are more stable, which is the main reason for the trend toward public universities' seeking private support. The recession-driven tuition increases will accelerate this trend. That would be a good thing.
The Case for Tuition Increases at Public Universities-Becker
The fiscal crisis in many states of the United States has led these states to cut their funding of public colleges and universities. The newly elected governor of California, Jerry Brown, has proposed to significantly cut state funding to California public colleges and universities, the most extensive and prestigious public system of higher education in the United States. To compensate at least in part for the cuts in public funding, tuition at American public institutions of higher learning is increasing significantly.
Something similar is going on in countries where cash-strapped central governments finance most university expenses. The newly elected British coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats last month approved a contentious bill that allows universities beginning in the fall of 2012 to raise tuition to a maximum of more than $14,000 a year compared to present levels of about $5000. Note that the average tuition and fees at American four-year public institutions was about $7,500 for in-state students, and it was over $12,000 for out-of–state students. Students at different British universities opposed the proposal to raise tuition by occupying university buildings, picketing the British Parliament building, and engaging in various acts of violence, but the bill passed anyway (by a close vote).
Tuition and other fees at public colleges and universities generally are much less than the cost of providing the education. To be sure, tuition and fees at private nonprofit institutions are also generally considerably less than education costs. The crucial difference, however, between public and private institutions is that the gap between costs and tuition revenue of private schools is mainly covered through voluntary contributions from alumni, private foundations, and others, whereas a sizable fraction of the gap at state-run schools is paid out of taxes imposed on state residents.
The case for higher tuition for students at state-run institutions of higher learning is powerful. A compelling reason to raise tuition at the present time is that many states have serious fiscal problems because their overall spending increased during the past decade at unsustainable rates. They are searching for various ways to cut their spending, and there is little reason why public spending on universities should be exempt from this fiscal pressure.
The average college graduate earns much more than the average individual who does not go to college. As a result, college graduates earn a lot more on average than does the typical taxpayer. It is a questionable system of regressive taxation when taxes are spent on subsidizing individuals who will earn more than those paying the taxes.
To be sure, without offsetting subsidies, high tuition discourages poorer students from attending college. These students should not be priced out of higher education, but it is not sensible to insure that these students can attend by charging low tuition to everyone, including students from higher income backgrounds. Rather, poor students alone should be directly subsidized with grants, and/or extensive loan programs could enable all students to borrow to finance their education. They would then repay any loans from their higher earnings after they finish school. Perhaps individuals who earn less would have to repay a smaller fraction of their loans. The British bill that raised tuition does not require students to pay any tuition upfront since they could borrow all their tuition from the government, and then pay back gradually after they finish school. The US federal government also has an extensive program that makes loans to students at both private and public colleges and universities.
Another argument commonly made against further increases in tuition is that tuition already rose substantially during the past decades, even after adjusting for increases in the price level. For example, tuition and fees at the University of Illinois, Urbana increased from $4770 in the academic year 2000 to $13, 508 in the 2011 academic year. However, the growth in tuition was mainly a response to the large increase in the earnings of college graduates compared to individuals who never went to college. Salaries and other benefits paid to professors are the main cost of providing a college education, and these benefits went up by a lot because earnings of college graduates increased by so much since 1980. The growth in earnings of college graduates, and of persons with a post-graduate education, made a college education a very good deal, despite the increases in tuition, because the gains from going to college increased by much more than the costs of going.
A quite different argument often made in support of subsidizing students is that individuals with higher education produce large benefits to others in their country or region (positive "externalities") as well as to themselves. Yet while individuals with advanced degrees who do research and development work sometimes produce important innovations that confer benefits on society as a whole, the US and many other governments already subsidize R&D spending. Similarly, governments subsidize college-educated (and other) individuals who make films, write books, and produce artwork.
Perhaps these subsidies should be increased, but that is distinct from subsidizing all college students with low tuition. For if society benefits from having college-educated persons engaged in particular activities, such as research, it is better directly to subsidize spending on these activities (perhaps more generously than at present) than to subsidize all college students, including, for example, salesmen, bankers, and lawyers.