April 29, 2012
Are the Incentives of Colleges Aligned With Social Welfare?
Are the Incentives of Colleges Aligned With Social Welfare? Becker
The over 4,000 American private and public colleges and universities compete fiercely for students, faculty, and grants, and constitute the most competitive system of higher education in the world that provides both high quality and low quality programs. American universities are a magnet for postgraduate, and increasingly also for undergraduate, students from other countries. These two facts suggest that American universities (like Posner I use the word university to stand also for colleges) are doing a very good job of catering to the interests of students the world over. More generally, American universities are pretty successful in producing higher education that contributes effectively to social welfare,** given** the public policies that impinge on their behavior.
American public, private non-profit, and increasingly for-profit institutions of higher education compete hard for students and faculty. As a result, they offer a variety of courses, programs, and qualities of colleges and universities that range from a bare minimum program at many public community colleges to elite education at universities like Harvard, Stanford, and Chicago. These programs cater to students of varying qualities and with different interests. Students vote with their feet by choosing some institutions and programs over others, and by traveling long distances from other countries to attend American universities. This "voting" has made American universities responsive to the interests of students, which on the whole is a very good thing since these interests reflect changing job prospects and other changes in society.
In addition, American universities conduct much of the basic research conducted in the US, with support from the federal government and private gifts. That many young and older scientists and scholars from abroad compete to spend significant time at American universities is a good indication of the leading edge quality of this research. Perhaps they do not do "enough" basic research, but they do much more than universities elsewhere, and they would do even more if the federal government increased its support of university research.
American universities have been criticized because many of them engage in high-level competitive sports that involve heavy recruitment of student athletes. Since students and alumni like rooting for their school's teams, these are perfectly appropriate activities for universities, aside from a couple of major problems. One is the exemption that the Supreme Court has granted to the obvious cartel-like behavior of the NCAA that uses its power to severely restrict compensation to student athletes, especially those in football and basketball. Universities should be forced to pay competitive prices for these athletes, not the much lower cartelized prices that the NCAA enforces. A much higher cost of star football and basketball players would induce some universities to tone down their emphasis on these sports, but many universities would still compete in these and other sports.
I agree with Posner that the federally financed student loan program needs significant modifications. More market-based interest rates on these loans are desirable, but in addition students under various circumstances should be allowed to borrow more than the current maximum limits on these loans. Especially students who attend expensive private universities may want to borrow more than they can at present, but most of them also receive high enough earnings later on to finance the interest repayment burden on these loans. It is no harder for most families to carry $100, 000 or more in student loans than it is for them to repay mortgage loans of comparable size.
However, students who are fettered with loans that they cannot repay should be able to discharge all or part of their loans through personal bankruptcy. To be sure, unlike mortgages, student loans do not have collateral that can be taken over by lenders in case of defaults on the loans. This is not so different than home ownership in the many states that do not allow the individuals declaring personal bankruptcy to be sued, although lenders can foreclose their homes. Despite the absence of collateral, workers who cannot repay their student loans should have the option of reducing the burden through discharging some of the loans through personal bankruptcy, the way other debt can be dischargeable through bankruptcy. To limit the abuse of this privilege, universities (including the for-profits) that make many student loans that end up being in arrears or discharged through bankruptcy should have their ability to make further loans severely constrained. This is already done to some extent, but tightening these constraints would force schools to be more careful in who they qualify for loans and the amounts they qualify for.
Having taught for almost all my adult life at American universities I am well aware of their many limitations. These include faculty who cater to students by easy grading and telling jokes, faculty who engage in vicious battles over trivial issues, faculty and administrators who are afraid to take stands against political correctness and the latest education fads, alumni and other donors who are cultivated for large gifts that really do not help a university's mission, and so forth. Nevertheless, on the whole, American universities do an excellent job of providing up to date and diversified education for students of varying abilities and interests. Many of their "failures" are the result of bad incentives provided by federal and state support and regulation of university programs. Students the world over have voted for decades with their feet in favor of American universities against what is available in other countries.
Are the Incentives of College Administrators Well Aligned with Social Welfare? Posner
A promising field of economics called organization economics studies the organization of activity within complex entities such as for-profit corporations, government agencies, and not-for-profit private corporations. Colleges and universities (which I'll discuss interchangeably, calling both types of institution of higher education "university" because universities are generally larger and more influential) straddle these divides—there are public universities, private not-for-profit universities, and private for-profit universities. I'll focus on the second—private not-for-profit universities. Public universities don't seem much different from private not-for-profit ones, in part because in recent years many public universities have made sustained and successful efforts at raising money from alumni and foundations, lessening their dependence on state funding and as a result achieving considerable, in some cases virtually complete, autonomy. As for the for-profit universities, they presumably can be modeled as typical for-profit service corporations. That leaves the not-for-profit university, which plays a much larger role in American higher education than in higher education in other countries. Most of the wealthiest and most prestigious American universities are private.
The differences between for-profit and not-for-profit institutions are not profound; we observe this in their coexistence in a number of fields, such as health care and education. The major difference is that for-profit institutions are financed in part by equity investment, in which the investors are compensated by ownership of any residual of revenue over cost—i.e., profit—while not-for-profit institutions are forbidden to distribute the residual to investors. They borrow, just like for-profit institutions, but the remainder of their capital consists of donations rather than of equity investment; the university's endowment correspondents to the equity in a for-profit corporation. The residual goes in part to university administrators in the form of enhanced salary or bonuses and in part (usually in larger part) to expanding or improving the institution.
Not-for-profits are more risk-averse than for-profits because their administrators cannot capture as much of the upside of risky investing as equity investors, and corporate executives, whose compensation is usually tied in one way or another to the corporation's profitability, can. But competition forces even not-for-profits to take some risks, as we learned when the financial crisis that began in 2008 revealed the degree to which university endowments had been invested in high-rolling hedge and private equity funds. Competition for students and faculty forces university administrators to seek to maximize revenue and minimize cost. Competition is a pervasive socioeconomic phenomenon; it is not limited to businesses.
The competitive pressures on universities can and often do result in a misalignment between private and social goals. From the standpoint of society as a whole, the goals of higher education are to enlarge general (as distinct from firm-specific) human capital by imparting valuable intellectual skills to young people of intelligence and ambition, and to produce research that generates mainly external benefits and so is underproduced by for-profit entities. And to a large extent, certainly, the universities work toward those goals, and with considerable success. But from the personal standpoint of a private university's trustees and administrators, another goal is to maximize revenue (net of cost) and hence tuition income, donations, research grants, and income from consulting and patents—the grant money and income from consulting and especially patents being shared between faculty and university. The consequences of these endeavors include a high level of expenditures on student amenities (to attract rich kids), on intercollegiate sports (to stimulate alumni donations), and on faculty "stars" who can attract research grants and impress parents and alumni. Other consequences include light teaching loads for faculty stars as a form of untaxed compensation, student pandering (beyond provision of amenities) and so grade inflation, reduction in required courses, and proliferation of extracurricular activities—all being aspects of treating students as "consumers" to be pampered in partial compensation for high tuition and student debt and to encourage future donations. Still other consequences of endeavors to maximize revenue include recruitment of student athletes who may have no intellectual interests or promise, "legacy" admissions (discrimination in favor of student applicants who are children of alumni, especially wealthy alumni), and encouraging applied research (because it is patentable, as basic research is not). False advertising of job opportunities for graduates of graduate schools and professional schools (such as law) is also a not uncommon university marketing tool.
From an overall social standpoint, therefore, there is a great deal of waste in the American university sector (as there is in most institutions), but it is not obvious to me what if anything should be done about it. I note, however, that there is a good deal of government subsidization of private universities, in the form of research grants but, more important, of below-market student loans. Government grants for basic research are defensible because, by definition, basic research generates only external benefits. Subsidizing tuition by means of below-market student loans makes less sense. If the loans, not being subsidized, were more costly, tuition would be lower; and promising students would still receive scholarships and low-cost loans, financed by the universities themselves, because universities want to have good students (along with student athletes, legacies, and "diversity" admits), to build reputation and attract good faculty. Many students who receive subsidized loans to enable them to go to college, but would not be subsidized by a university, would be better off not going to college. College is not for everyone.