May 12, 2013
College Costs and Quality
College Costs and Quality—Posner
I graduated from Yale College in 1959. Tuition, room, and board at Yale in the late 1950s was $2000 a year; this year it is $60,000. Adjusted for inflation, this is a more than threefold increase. Average salary for a full professor at Yale went from $13,000 in 1959 to $186,000 this year (excluding medical school faculty), which after correction for inflation, an almost twofold increase. The rates of increase in these two variables varies from college to college, but I believe it is generally true that college costs have risen significantly faster than faculty costs. One thing that has depressed the increase in faculty costs is the increasing use of graduate students and other part-time faculty in lieu of tenure-track faculty. In addition, the administrative staffs of colleges have grown rapidly, in part because of increased legal regulation of education. Also, colleges have increased the quality of student housing and provided other amenities for students, in an effort to compete more effectively for rich kids. In addition, greatly reduced state subsidies for state colleges, in the wake of the economic depression that began in 2008, have forced state colleges to increase tuition.
The increase in faculty salaries may be in part a "Baumol" phenomenon. The economist William Baumol pointed out long ago that competition may force up salaries in markets in which capital is not a good substitute for labor, and the result in those markets will be higher prices unrelated to higher quality. Suppose there are productivity increases in engineering but not in teaching; still, teacher salaries will have to rise in order for colleges to be able to compete with engineering firms for labor, and because there are few if any productivity improvements in teaching the higher salaries will be translated into higher prices. An alternative explanation is that salaries for skilled workers in general have risen, and college teachers are skilled. But it is only if skilled workers have alternatives in other markets that their wages would rise in markets that do not show productivity gains. But, to repeat, increased faculty salaries, whatever their cause, do not explain the steep increase in college costs.
I do not have the sense that the quality of college education has improved in the last half century. Colleges have become more competitive, but the forms that the increased competition has taken do not seem to have improved quality. From the standpoint of society as a whole, the goals of higher education are to enlarge general (as distinct from firm-specific) human capital by imparting valuable intellectual skills to young people of intelligence and ambition, and to produce research that generates mainly external benefits and so is underproduced by for-profit entities. To a large extent, certainly, colleges and universities work toward those goals, and with considerable success. But from the standpoint of a private college's trustees and administrators, an equally important goal is to maximize the institution's revenue (net of cost) and hence tuition income, donations, research grants, and income from consulting and patents—the grant money and income from consulting and especially patents being shared between faculty and university. The consequences of these endeavors include a high level of expenditures on student amenities (to attract rich kids), on intercollegiate sports (to stimulate alumni donations), and on faculty "stars" who can attract research grants and impress parents and alumni. Other consequences include light teaching loads for faculty stars as a form of untaxed compensation, the shift of teaching responsibilities from tenured faculty to graduate students and non-tenure-track floating faculty, pandering to students (beyond just the provision of amenities) and so grade inflation, reduction in required courses and distribution requirements, dilution of college-level education by promiscuous grant of advanced-placement credits (in effect giving college credit for high-school coursework), and proliferation of extracurricular activities—all being aspects of treating students as "consumers" to be pampered in partial compensation for high tuition and student debt and to encourage future donations. Still other consequences of endeavors to maximize revenue include recruitment of student athletes who may have no intellectual interests or promise, "legacy" admissions (discrimination in favor of student applicants who are children of alumni, especially wealthy alumni—though that is a very old practice, as is recruitment of student athletes), and encouraging applied research (because it is patentable, as basic research is not). False advertising of job opportunities for graduates of graduate schools and professional schools (such as law) is also a not uncommon university marketing tools.
The federal student loan guaranty has pernicious aspects. In particular, it disincentivizes colleges to screen student loan applicants, and in fact incentivizes college administrators not only to raise tuition but also to encourage students to take on excessive debt, since the loans are guaranteed and therefore the university doesn't have to worry about whether the students can pay back the loans.
The greatest hope for improvements in quality and reduction in costs of higher education may be the "MOOCs"—massive open online courses. They have revolutionary potential for enhancing competition in higher education by using computer and communications technology to improve quality and drastically reduce cost.
The Rise in College Tuition and Student Loans-Becker
During the past 30 years tuition at American colleges has been growing at a fast pace. The increase has been greatest at 4-year private colleges and universities, and least at 2-year public colleges, but all college categories have had large tuition increases. For example, real tuition at the 4-year private colleges has more than doubled since 1980, while tuition at 2-year public colleges increased by over 50%.
Many commentators have criticized these large tuition increases. Colleges and universities are said to be too greedy and are charging what the traffic will bear, or colleges are claimed to conspire together to increase tuition. Although colleges do conspire on some financial issues, such as agreeing through the NCAA to prevent payments to college athletes, conspiracy is not likely to be important in determining tuition since over 4000 colleges and universities compete fiercely for students, faculty, and funding.
The growth in tuition is not explained by any conspiracy theory, but mainly by increases in the cost of producing college education. Professors and other teachers are the principal input in colleges, so that the cost of these teachers is an important determinant of the cost of producing education. College teachers are well educated since they almost always have Masters degrees, and at the better colleges and universities they are very likely to have PhDs or similar advanced degrees.
Colleges have to compete for highly educated persons against employers in both the private and public sectors. Since after 1980 earnings of highly educated persons has risen rapidly in these other sectors, colleges have had to pay a lot more for their faculties and administrative staffs. The greatly increased pay of faculty has substantially raised college costs, which in part have been passed on to students through higher tuition and other fees.
This analysis also explains why tuition has grown most rapidly at 4-year private colleges and other elite schools. These schools tend to have faculties that are considered the most skilled and productive, and they invariably have PhDs or other advanced degrees. Since the rise in earnings in recent decades has been greatest for the most educated individuals, the costs of more elite colleges and universities have risen faster than that of other schools. They too have passed through to students some of these much greater costs via much higher tuition.
The increased return to greater skill means that colleges have an incentive to increase the workload of students, and improve the quality of the education they provide. Higher quality education is more expensive, however, which further has increased the cost of providing education, and the tuition charged students.
Whatever the cause of the tuition increases, to many that indicates that college is no longer a good investment. That is, the costs of going to college are claimed to now outweigh the benefits for many of the students who attend college. This is particularly the case, it is argued, for students who take out large student loans to finance their education.
A benefit-cost analysis of an activity like attending college cannot be based only on costs, in this case represented by tuition, but also requires evidence on benefits. While tuition increased rapidly since the 1980s, so too did the monetary returns from college. In 1980, the average graduate of a 4-year college earned about 40% more than the average high school graduate, whereas now the average college premium is over 80%. The increase in earnings has been even greater for persons who received graduate degrees.
What happened to the value of a college education during the past several decades depends on how the increase in earnings from going to college compares to the increase in tuition and other costs of college. Calculations show that the average gain in earnings during the past 30 years has exceeded the rise in tuition, so that the average rate of return on graduating from college has greatly increased, despite the large growth in tuition.
Nevertheless, the rise in tuition has forced many students to take on larger student loans than students did in the past. This has led to growing calls to forgive much of student indebtedness, even though college is a better deal than it was in the past, and student loans are already significantly subsidized. Moreover, despite a widespread belief that student loans are the main source of debt to younger individuals, in fact student loans remain a relatively small fraction of their total debt. An article in the New York Times of May 11 shows that although student loans have grown rapidly during the past decade, they are still only 15% of the total debt of individuals under age 35 (and a smaller fraction of the debt of those over age 35), whereas mortgages comprise 74% of their debt. The article claims that the "heavy" load of student debt is weighing on economy, but surely mortgages are a far more important influence on the spending of younger families.
Of course, a high level of student debt is a burden for individuals who are not earning a lot, and the default rate on student loans is much higher for low earners than for others with student debt. Students with low earnings mainly went either to proprietary colleges or to 2-year colleges. Their debt problems are not surprising since it is well known that these students are not likely to earn a lot after they enter the labor force. Perhaps greater constraint should be placed on their access to publically subsidized student loans, and perhaps interest rates on student loans should be positively related to earnings.
But any changes in policies regarding student loans should recognize that despite the rapid growth in tuition, college education remains a very good investment for the large majority of students who graduate from college.