December 22, 2013
China's "One Child" Policy
China's "One Child" Policy—Posner
The recent announcement that China's "one child" policy is being relaxed to the extent that if one parent is himself or herself an only child, the couple can have a second child, rather than, as previously, both must be only children to be permitted to have a second child, is likely to have some effect on the Chinese birthrate. For there must be a large number of only children, now adults, in China. The one-child policy was instituted in 1981, which means that any person under the age of 31 or 32 today was born when the policy was in effect, and many of these would now be of marrigeable age. So the modification of the policy will make only children more marriageable! Therefore, if the modified policy is expected to continue for many years, married couples will have an incentive to continue to have only one child, to enhance the child's marriage prospects.
As Becker explains, it is unlikely that the one-child policy had a dramatic effect on the Chinese birthrate, not only because of the other factors (what collectively are referred to as the "demographic transition") that can cause dramatic reductions in birthrate, but also because the policy was somewhat porous, both in theory and in practice. There were a number of exceptions. As enforcement shifted (not entirely, however) from abortion and sterilization to fines ("social compensation fees," as they are called) as the primary sancteions for violation of the policy, well-off couples could have an additional child or even additional children. But only well-off couples, because the fines are stiff. And a Chinese who obtains an advanced degree from a foreign university is exempted from the one-child policy too. Notice that both these exceptions could be thought eugenic in purpose or effect, since the well off and the recipients of foreign advanced degrees are groups highly likely to have higher than average IQs. Still another exemption, again focused on the well off, is for couples who have an additional child abroad but do not register the child as a Chinese citizen when they return to China. A nonregistered child is not eligible for free public schooling and health care—which is why this exemption too is as a practical matter limited to the well off.
There are bits of evidence which taken together strongly suggest that the one-child policy is not the, or perhaps even a, major driver of Chinese birthrates. One, from my own experience as a judge, is that virtually all the cases we see in which a Chinese woman or couple is seeking asylum in the United States for fear of sanctions for violating the one-child policy (while here in the U.S.) if returned to China are from a single province—Fujian. Fujian is a large province, with a population of some 35 million, but that is a very small fraction of the entire Chinese population. Fujian appears to be a determined enforcer of the one-child policy; perhaps it's the only determined enforcer. Indeed there is considerable evidence that it still resorts to abortion and sterilization (though how often one doesn't know) as sanctions for violating the one-child province, even though the official Chinese position is that the only sanctions are monetary. As in this example, though China is a dictatorship there appears to be a good deal of local autonomy—and also a good deal of corruption. It is possible that in much of China the one-child policy is a dead letter, though this is merely my conjecture.
As Becker points out, when the one-child policy was adopted in 1981, the total fertility rate (the total number of children born to the average woman) was 2.8. According to one source (indexmundi: census data online, www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=ch&v=31), it fell to 1.82 in 2001, but only to 1.79 in 2009—from which it plunged to 1.55 in 2012. The CIA World Factbook estimates the 2013 total fertility rate at 1.55 as well. Some China experts consider the figure too high—that it is closer to 1.3. Both figures imply a very steep fall in a three-year period, which can't be attributed to the one-child policy, making one wonder how much of the decline from 1981 to 2000 (2.8 to 1.82) is attributable to the policy. According to World Bank estimates, the Chinese fertility rate fell much faster before than after the one-child policy as instituted—from 6 in the 1960s to less than half of that on the eve of the new policy.
One could hardly expect the "demographic transition" to reduce the average number of children per woman over her lifetime to 1; but on the other hand China has not yet reached that yet is relaxing the one-child policy. According to the online source above, the total fertility rate is only 1.4 in Italy and slightly lower in Japan, and is below 1.3 in South Korea—all countries that don't have a one-child policy. (The rate in the United States is slightly above 2.)
So it is an open question how much effect the one-child policy has had on the Chinese birthrate.
The Consequences of Abandoning China's One Child Policy- Becker
One of the major policy changes that emerged from China's recent Third Plenum Congress is a resolution that modifies the "one child" policy. This policy has been in effect since 1981, so the resolution recognizes that the one child policy may no longer be needed, and possibly even that it was mistaken in the first place. The reason why it may have been mistaken is that fertility would have declined a lot after 1981 even without this policy because of the rapid growth in incomes and education, and the shift out of agriculture toward cities.
The one child policy mandates that families can only have one child, but has allowed exceptions for minorities, certain rural families, and parents who are both only children. This policy was often vigorously and cruelly enforced, including forced abortions during very late terms, sterilizations, heavy fines for violations, and occasionally even imprisonment. The new announcement only slightly widens the exceptions by allowing couples to have more than one child even when only one of the parents is an only child. But this change is widely taken as a sign that the government will be much more accepting of families that have additional children.
The many exceptions to the one child rule explains why the average woman continued to have more than one child. For example, in 1990 the total fertility rate (TFR)- the number of children born to the average women over her lifetime- was over 2. By the year 2010 the official data has a TFR of 1.18, but private estimates suggest the number of children is underreported. Adjusted estimates put the TFR at 1.35, and even higher. Still, everyone agrees that the TFR has fallen substantially since the one child policy went into effect from its 1981 level of 2.8.
Before attributing this large decline to the one child policy, one should recognize that China's per capita income, average education level, and degree of urbanization all grew rapidly in the decades after the reforms of the Chinese economy that began in 1978. Families with higher incomes and greater education who live in urban areas have many fewer children than poorer and less educated families in rural environments.
Although it is not possible to know precisely what Chinese fertility would have been absent the one child policy, preliminary calculations by Jung Sekong and myself based on the effects of income, education, urbanization, and other variables in surrounding Asian countries suggest that China's TFR in recent years would have been about 1.5 because of the rapid rise in Chinese incomes and education. This means that a large increase in Chinese fertility from its present low level is unlikely even if the one child policy were completely eliminated rather than only modestly relaxed. Intervening changes in China since 1981 due mainly to its radical shift in the late 1970s toward a more market economy would have greatly lowered fertility in any case.
China's fertility is now somewhat lower than it would have been absent the one child policy, and the decline since 1981 has also probably been more rapid. The many families who were prevented from having more than one child certainly suggest that the policy did bite. Yet, that China's fertility declined sharply in the 1970s even before the one child policy went into effect indicates there were already forces in China pushing fertility down prior to the introduction of economic reforms.
China's one child policy has contributed to the rapid aging of the Chinese population even though other powerful forces were also at work. This aging is causing major problems in providing for adequate medical care and retirement income of the elderly since government social security and heath programs are spotty, and many elderly individuals have only one child who might help them out.
Birth decisions by parents that are free to choose their family size are based on the incomes, education, and other personal characteristics of the parents, and on the expected opportunities of their children. Both of these changed rapidly after the late 1970s. China's one child policy has been an experiment in social engineering that invaded these most personal of decisions. Although it apparently succeeded in lowering China's fertility below what it would have been, the policy did not anticipate that the economic reforms begun in 1978 would have led to much lower fertility anyway. From this perspective, the policy has been largely unnecessary, and has done more harm than good.